

Verbal modulation with *must*, etc., is now a kind of modality (see Chapter 10); it is semantically related to those passive causative modulations which have the circumstantial senses of 'do under compulsion/from obligation/ with permission'. What links this semantically to modality in the other sense, that of probability, is that both represent a judgement on the part of the speaker: just as in *that may be John* the *may* expresses the speaker's judgement of likelihood ('I consider it possible'), so in *John may go* the *may* expresses the speaker's judgement of obligation ('I give permission'). Analyses in Figure 7-29.




Fig. 7-29 Modulation (a) as causative verbal group complex with Agent (b) as verbal group complex (c) as modality (finite element of verbal group)

7A.6 Hypotaxis: verbal group, projection

We pointed out in the previous subsection that a hypotactic verbal group complex of the 'expansion' type represented a single happening. Thus, there is only one time reference; if the reference is to tomorrow, then the tense of the primary group will be future:

- (i) phase: he'll start to do it tomorrow (not: he starts)
- (ii) conation: he'll try to do it tomorrow (not: he tries)
- (iii) modulation: he'll help to do it tomorrow (not: he helps)

An expression such as *want to do* looks at first sight very similar to these; but whereas we can say *he'll want to do it tomorrow*, it is also quite normal to say *he wants to do it tomorrow*. The wanting and the doing have distinct time references. We can even say *yesterday I wanted to do it tomorrow* — but not *yesterday I started to do it tomorrow*.

The relation between *want* and *to do* is one of projection. A projection of *do it*, as in *wants to do it*, is a meaning, and thus does not imply 'does it' — whereas an expansion, such as *tries to do it* or *starts to do it*, does imply 'does it', even though the doing may be partial or unsuccessful.

We saw in Section 4 of this chapter that a mental process of affection projects an exchange of the goods-&-services type, i.e. a proposal. If the Subject of the projection is the same as that of the mental process clause, the proposal is an offer, as in *she wants to do it*; if the two are different, then the proposal is a command, as in *she wants you to do it*. In the first type, the Subject is not repeated, but is carried over from the affective clause. (It can then be made explicit by a reflexive, as in *she wants to do it herself*.)

All such projections could be treated as clause nexuses, as in Figure 7-30.




Fig. 7-30 Projecting clause complex with *want*

However, there are some respects in which they resemble nexuses of the verbal group. (1) The projected element, a (typically perfective) non-finite, has — like the expansion types — given birth to what are now tenses of the verb, namely the two future forms *will* and *be going to*. (2) The WH- probe is *what does she want to do?*, rather than simply *what does she want?*; compare *what is she trying to do?* not *what is she trying?*. (3) The command forms — those with change of Subject — resemble some of the causative expansions; compare the following pairs, including the passives:

- she wants him to do it she causes him/gets him to do it
- he is wanted to do it he is caused/got to do it
- she wants it (to be) done she causes it to be done/gets it done

It is in this area that expansion and projection come to meet and overlap. Causing something to be done means that it is done, with 'external agency' as a circumstantial feature. Wanting something to be done means that it is envisaged, or projected, but may or may not happen: its status is that of a metaphorical phenomenon, not a phenomenon. But the line between the two is fuzzy. In general, if the relationship can be expressed by a finite *that* clause, as in *she wished that he would come*, then in principle it is a projection; but in this respect too there is a 'grey' area: *she wanted that he should*