



Fig. 10-17 Example with modal and transitivity metaphors

act of speaking as a report or as a quote, e.g. *he threatened to shoot/that he would shoot the pianist; 'I'll shoot the pianist,' he threatened*. But this wording alone itself carries no explicit signal of being an instance of this or that specific category. It selects for mood, realizing the basic speech functions of offer, command, statement or question as described in Chapter 4; note that here already there is the possibility of metaphorical transference, since these are only the congruent patterns. Beyond that, however, its specific rhetorical function is made manifest by any or all of a variety of other factors, which are actually of five different kinds:

- (1) Paradigmatically associated (that is, simultaneous) lexicogrammatical features; for example 'key', realized by the selection of tone (see Chapter 8); lexical connotations; e.g.  
 $//$  1 + 3  $\sim$  I'll / shoot that / bastard of a / pianist  $//$
- (2) Syntagmatically associated (that is, preceding or following) lexicogrammatical features; for example expansion by a conditional clause, e.g.

I'll shoot the pianist if he doesn't play in time.

Note that some verbs can be used 'performatively'; that is, as CONSTITUTING the rhetorical act they name: *I (hereby) promise to . . . , Do you undertake to . . . ?* The verb *threaten* cannot; but *promise* can, so *promise* may stand in metaphorically for *threaten*, as in:

I promise you I'll shoot the pianist.

- (3) Paralinguistic and behavioural features such as voice quality, facial expression and gesture.
- (4) Features of the context of situation: what is going on, who is taking part, and what the speech acts are designed to achieve.
- (5) Features of the context of culture: other things being equal, it is generally regarded as undesirable for shoot pianists even if their playing is not quite up to standard.

The lexicogrammatical resources of mood, therefore, and the associated patterns of modality and key, carry a very considerable semantic load, as the expression of interpersonal rhetoric. Not surprisingly, these categories lend themselves to a rich variety of metaphorical devices; and it is by no means easy to decide what are metaphorical and what are congruent forms. Some common speech-functional formulae are clearly metaphorical in origin, for example (i) *I wouldn't . . . if I was you*: command, congruently *don't . . . I functioning as warning*; (ii) *I've a good mind to . . . ; modalized offer, congruently maybe I'll . . . , typically functioning as threat*; (iii) *she'd better . . . ; modulated command, congruently she should . . . , typically functioning as advice*. Some words, such as *mind*, seem particularly to lend themselves to this kind of transference: cf. *would you mind . . . ? , mind you! , I don't mind . . . (including I don't mind if I do, positive response to offer of drink in environment pub) and so on*.

Metaphors of this kind have been extensively studied in speech act theory, originally under the heading of 'perlocutionary' acts. From a linguistic point of view