



Fig. 10-14 System of orientations in modality

or inclination (i.e. no coded expressions for 'I recognize it as usual that ...' or 'I undertake for ... to ...'). This is a systematic gap; these particular combinations would represent semantic domains where the speaker cannot readily pose as an authority. Examples of the combination of orientation and type are given in Table 10(2).

Table 10(2) Modality: examples of 'type' and orientation combined

	Subjective: explicit	Subjective: implicit	Objective: implicit	Objective: explicit
Modalization: probability	I think [in my opinion] Mary knows	Mary'll know	Mary probably knows [in all probability]	it's likely that Mary knows [Mary is likely to]
Modalization: usually	Fred'll sit quite quiet	Fred'll sit quite quiet	Fred usually sits quite quiet	it's usual for Fred to sit quite quiet
Modulation: obligation	I want John to go	John should go	John's supposed to go	it's expected that John goes
Modulation: inclination		Jane'll help	Jane's keen to help	

The third variable in modality is the value that is attached to the modal judgement: high, median or low. These values are summarized in Table 10(3), with 'objective implicit' forms as category labels. The median value is clearly set apart from the two 'outer' values by the system of polarity: the median is that in which the negative is freely transferable between the proposition and the modality:

direct negative *transferred negative*

(prob.) it's likely Mary doesn't know it isn't likely Mary knows
(usu.) Fred usually doesn't stay Fred doesn't usually stay
(obl.) John's supposed not to go John's not supposed to go
(incl.) Jane's keen not to take part Jane's not keen to take part

With the outer values, on the other hand, if the negative is transferred the value switches (either from high to low, or from low to high):

Table 10(3) Three 'values' of modality

	Probability	Usuality	Obligation	Inclination
High	certain	always	required	determined
Median	probable	usually	supposed	keen
Low	possible	sometimes	allowed	willing

direct negative

transferred negative

(p: high) it's certain Mary doesn't know it isn't possible Mary knows
(p: low) it's possible Mary doesn't know it isn't certain Mary knows
(u: high) Fred always doesn't stay Fred doesn't sometimes stay
(u: low) Fred never stays Fred doesn't ever stay
(o: high) Fred sometimes doesn't stay Fred doesn't always stay
(o: low) John's required not to go John isn't allowed to go
(i: high) John's allowed not to go John isn't required to go
(i: low) Jane's determined not to take part Jane isn't willing to take part
(i: low) Jane's willing not to take part Jane isn't determined to take part

These are illustrated here with the 'objective implicit' orientation, except for those of probability which are 'objective/explicit' — the purpose being to choose those where the system is displayed most obviously and clearly. In fact the possibility of transferring the negative from proposition to modality applies throughout, always with the same switch between high and low; for example (probability/subjective/explicit):

direct negative

transferred negative

(median) I think Mary doesn't know I don't think Mary knows
(high) I know Mary doesn't know I can't imagine Mary knows
(low) I imagine Mary doesn't know I don't know that Mary knows

The most complex pattern of realization is the 'subjective/implicit', that with the modal operators, for example (probability/subjective/implicit):

direct negative

transferred negative

(median) that'll [will] not be John that won't be John
(high) that must not be John that can't be John
(low) that may not be John that needn't be John

These are further complicated by a great deal of dialectal and individual variation. But the underlying pattern can be discerned throughout, and is useful in throwing light on all the variants that are found to occur.

We have now set up a network of modality systems as in Figure 10-15. This generates a set of $4 \times 4 \times 3 \times 3 = 144$ categories of modality. Thirty of these are illustrated in Figure 10-6 (key provided in Table 10(4)).

There is one further category that needs to be taken into account, that of ability/potentiality, as in *she can keep the whole audience enthralled*. This is on the fringe of the modality system. It has the different orientations of subjective (implicit only) realized by *can/can't*, objective implicit by *be able to*, and objective explicit by *it is possible (for ...) to*. In the last of these, the typical meaning is 'potentiality', as in *it was possible for a layer of ice to form*. In the subjective it is closer to inclination; we could recognize a general category of 'readiness', having 'inclination' and 'ability' as subcategories at one end of the scale (*can/is able to* as 'low'-value variants of *will/is willing to*). In any case *can* in this sense is untypical of the modal operators: it is the only case where the oblique form functions as a simple past, as in *I couldn't read that before; now with my new glasses I can*.