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
**Fig. 10-11** Analysis of probability expressions

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself. A very brief account of modality was given in Chapter 4, Section 4.5; now that we have introduced the concept of grammatical metaphor we can give a somewhat more systematic description of the principal features of the modality system.


Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no — the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity. What this implies more specifically will depend on the underlying speech function of the clause. (1) If the clause is an 'information' clause (a proposition, congruently realized as indicative), this means either (i) 'either yes or no', i.e. 'maybe', or (ii) 'both yes and no', i.e. 'sometimes', in other words, some degree of probability or of usuality. (2) If the clause is a 'goods-&-services' clause (a proposal, which has no real congruent form in the grammar, but by default we can characterize it as imperative), it means either: (i) 'is wanted to', related to a command, or (ii) 'wants to', related to an offer; in other words, some degree of obligation or of inclination. We refer to type (1) as MODALIZATION and to type (2) as MODULATION; this gives a system as in Figure 10-12.

The four types are set out in diagrammatic form in Figure 10-13.

Note that modulation refers to the semantic category of proposals, but all modalities are realized as indicative (that is, as if they were propositions). Thus *imperative go home!*, when modulated, becomes indicative *you must go home!*.



**Fig. 10-12** System of types of modality



**Fig. 10-13** Diagram showing relation of modality to polarity and mood

(In philosophical semantics probability is referred to as 'epistemic' modality and obligation as 'deontic' modality. For the place of *can* 'be able to' in the system see below.)

Here is an example of each of the four types:

- |                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| 1. i [probability] | There can't be many candlestick-makers left.            |
| 1.ii [usuality]    | It'll change right there in front of your eyes.         |
| 2. i [obligation]  | The roads should pay for themselves, like the railways. |
| 2.ii [inclination] | Voters won't pay taxes any more.                        |

As these examples show, the modal operators can occur in all four types (for the full list of modal operators see Table 4(3) in Chapter 4 above). Their use is more restricted in usuality and in inclination than in the other two types; but as a class they cover all these senses. This brings out what it is that the four types of modality have in common: they are all varying degrees of polarity, different ways of construing the semantic space between the positive and negative poles.

THE BASIC distinction that determines how each type of modality will be realized is the ORIENTATION: that is, the distinction between subjective and objective modality, and between the explicit and implicit variants, discussed (with reference to probability) in the preceding section. The system is as in Figure 10-14. These combine with all four types of modality, but with gaps: for example, there are no systematic forms for making the subjective orientation explicit in the case of usability